Abstract-As control system networks are being connected to enterprise level networks for remote monitoring, operation, and system-wide performance optimization, these same connections are providing vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malicious actors for attack, financial gain, and theft of intellectual property. Much effort in cyber-physical system (CPS) protection has focused on protecting the borders of the system through traditional information security techniques. Less effort has been applied to the protection of cyber-physical systems from intelligent attacks launched after an attacker has defeated the information security protections to gain access to the control system.
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systems, health-care devices, and weapon systems to name a few [1] . Traditionally, only safety-critical system have built in protections against attack, however recent cyber-attacks on control system, e.g. [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] have shown that many of these protections such as network airgaps are insufficient. Stuxnet in particular demonstrated the ease with which an airgap can be penetrated [9] .
The many operational and business benefits to connecting SCADA and cyber-physical (CP) networks to enterprise networks and the increased utilization of wireless sensor and actuator networks [12] have introduced new vulnerabilities that can be exploited to attack control systems.
Information security methods for protecting network such an authentication and encryption do not appear to be sufficient for protecting CPSs [13] . Additionally, some information security techniques can reduce controller performance or render the control system unstable. Thus, in addition to information security techniques, attack detection and mitigation techniques need to be developed for the controller closed-loop dynamics.
Much research had been devoted to analyzing specific attacks on network sensor data. Denial of service and deception attacks on networked control systems are studied in [14] and a semidefinite programming countermeasure is proposed. False data injection attacks are shown in [15] and stealthy deception attacks are studied in [14] , [16] . Replay attacks present difficulties in detection and their effects on control systems are studied in [17] . In [18] a resilient control problem where an attacker corrupts control packets is discussed and a receding-horizon control law is suggested for stabilization during an attack. Robust and resilient control techniques applied to CP systems have been reported in [19] , [20] . The underlying physical dynamics are used for key establishment between the sensor and controller in [21] .
In this paper, we analyze actuator attacks from a general systems theoretic perspective for a large class of potential attack signals. Sensor signal attacks are analyzed for observerbased controlled systems. In particular, the error signals between states of attack free systems and systems subject to these attacks are quantified. Optimal sensor signal attacks for the finite and infinite horizon linear quadratic (LQ) control in terms of maximizing the corresponding cost functions are computed. The closed-loop system under optimal signal attacks are provided.
II. ACTUATOR CYBER-ATTACKS
In this section, we analyze the effect of cyber-attacks on the actuators. We assume that the attacker actuator signals with a time-varying signal ∆ u (t) that starts at t = 0. The system and controller based observer have the following form:
The error signal err(t) = x(t) −x(t), satisfiesėrr = (A − LC)err(t) and therefore err(t) −→ 0 as t −→ ∞ independently of the actuator attack signal. DoS corresponds to the case where the attacker cancel out the control signal, i.e., u α (t) = 0, and will lead to destabilizing the system and the observer. To see this, from (1) by taking u α (t) = 0 we have:
showing that the system and observer are unstable, since L is always chosen such that (A − LC) is Hurwitz, but then −(A − LC) is not. It should be noted that canceling the control signal is not the only denial of service attack that cyber-physical systems are vulnerable to.
Two actuator attack signals classes will be considered in the following, finite energy signals, and bounded signals. Finite energy signals correspond to attacks such as individual packet loss or modification, finite time attacks, and impulse attacks. Bounded attack signals encompass a large class of potential long term attack scenarios. The denial of service attack consisting of canceling the control signal is a special case of these attack classes.
A. Finite Energy Attacks
The first scenario is to assume that the attacker can modify the actuator signal u(t) with a finite energy signal in time,
is the space of Lesbesgue measurable and square integrable functions
where · is the Euclidean norm. Assuming a deception attack of finite energy
Taking the Laplace transform of (1) yields:
where X(·) and Err(·) are the Laplace Transforms of x(t) and err(t), respectively. Applying the final value theorem yields:
Expression (4) shows that under a finite energy actuator deception attack, the steady state converges to the corresponding reference signal. This is expected since the finite energy assumption,
, implies that the timevarying bias signal satisfies ∆ u (t) −→ 0 in steady state. (5) shows that the error signal converges to zero, in other words, the system maintains state awareness.
B. Bounded Attacks
For a persistent and bounded actuator attack,
and taking the reference signal err(t) ≡ 0, it follows from (1):
III. OPTIMAL ATTACKS ON FINITE HORIZON LINEAR QUADRATIC (LQ) CONTROL
We consider the plant described by the following statespace system:
The finite horizon linear quadratic (LQ) problem is concerned with minimizing the cost function:
where Q is a positive semi-definite matrix, Q ≥ 0. The objective of the LQ controller is the minimization of the cost (9) over causal linear full-information controllers. From standard LQ theory the optimal controller is the state feedback [22] :
where P is the solution of the Riccati equation:
The matrix P is non negative semi-definite, P ≥ 0 and is bounded above for any τ ≤ h [22] . By completing the square the cost J(u, x 0 , h, Q) takes the form:
from where it can be seen that with no attack the optimal controller is given by (10) , and the optimal cost:
In the next section, the effect of actuator signal attacks on LQ control system is studied.
A. Optimal Actuator Attack
The LQ cost (9) at time t can be written as [23] :
An attack at the actuator takes the form:
and transforms the LQ cost function (14) into:
The control u(·) objective is to minimize (16 ) , while the attacker aims at maximizing it. Therefore, u = −B T 2 P x and the optimal actuator attack is the solution to:
As before we shall assume some constraints on the signal ∆ u (·) otherwise the supremum in (22) would be infinite. That is, if the attacker has infinite energy or power then he can drive the cost to infinity. As discussed previously, more realistic attacks include finite energy and bounded signals. Let us first assume the former, i.e., ∆ u ∈ L 2 ([0, h), R m ), with say ∆ u 2 ≤ M , for some constant M > 0. In this case, the RHS of (22) is the L 2 -inner product of B T 2 P x with ∆ u and satisfies the following by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality:
Equality in the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality (18) is achieved when ∆ u and B T 2 P x are linearly dependent, i.e., there exits a scalar β > 0 such
which gives the actuator signal attack that achieves the upper bound in (19) . To compute β note that
Therefore, the optimal actuator signal attack is given by:
The attack signal (21) yields the corresponding worst case cost function: sup
The closed-loop state-space system under the optimal actuator attack signal (21) takes the form:
Expression (23) shows that an optimal actuator attack can cancel out the optimal negative state feedback u = −B T 2 P x, and replace it with positive feedback completely destabilizing the closed-loop system. The solution to the state equation (23) can be written as:
state response due to optimal L 2 actuator attack (24) where Φ(·, ·) is the state transition matrix corresponding to A − B 2 B t 2 P (·). Next, let us consider bounded signal actuator attacks, i.e.
clearly, for all ∆ u ∈ L ∞ ([0, h), R m the RHS of (25) satisfies the inequality:
The upper bound is achieved by choosing the actuator signal attack as:
on the set
Note the actuator signal depend in a nonlinear fashion on the state vector x(·). As a result under (28) the closed-loop system becomes nonlinear and can be written as:
The solution to (29) can be written as:
In the next section, optimal actuator attacks for the infinite horizon LQ control are discussed.
IV. OPTIMAL ACTUATOR ATTACKS FOR INFINITE HORIZON LQ CONTROL
The optimal actuator attacks in the infinite horizon case are similar to the finite horizon case. From (21) it is given by:
for the finite energy case, and for bounded signal attacks by (28)
The parallel closed-loop state equation is similar to the finite horizon case (23) with the state transition matrix Φ(·, ·) in (24) given by: This section provides a numerical experiment to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed attack strategies and validate the theoretical analysis. Considering the same power network model studied in [24] , we illustrate the effect of the actuator attack on system states for both finite and infinite horizon cases. Assuming that the attacker has access to the system parameters such as the state matrices A, B and C, the optimal actuator attacks for the infinite horizon LQ problem and for the finite horizon are simulated.
To illustrate the finite energy actuator signal attack for infinite horizon using a power network system of five generators, therefore a total ten states the simulation results are shown by the following Figures: actuator signal with no attack in Figure 1 , actuator signal with optimal attack in Figure 2 , the difference between no attack and optimal attack signals in Figure 3 . Now, to illustrate the finite energy actuator signal attack for finite horizon. The simulation results are shown by the following Figures: actuator signal with no attack in Figure 4 , actuator signal with optimal attack in Figure 5 , the difference between no attack and optimal attack signals in Figure 6 . Finally, the difference for the state signal with and without the undetectable attacks imply that the optimal actuator attack affect significantly the performance of the system.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a system theoretic analysis of the effect of finite energy and bounded attacks on linear systems with an LQ controller was presented. Specifically, the effects on the steady state response are derived. The optimal finite energy and bounded attacks for both the finite and infinite horizon LQ problem are developed my maximizing the corresponding LQ cost functions. The closed-loop systems under attack are given and a numerical simulation illustrates the effectiveness of the optimal attack. Future work will include analyzing the 
